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The Karabakh conflict in the Armenian policy of Turkey


Standpoint of Armenia

The Karabakh conflict in the Armenian policy of Turkey

Styopa Safaryan


Styopa Safaryan

Тhe founder of the Armenian Institute of International and Security Affairs

It seemed like the ideological optimism caused by the end of the Cold War in the system of the international relations will also irreversibly spur the normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations, and the objective and subjective factors calling to life a new possibility and working in favour of reconciliation of antagonistic past will turn out to be more powerful than the ones who throw obstacles in the way.   

However, the ideological optimism was the first to bedim quickly in the Caucasus, where, ethno-territorial conflicts open for the involvement of third parties, erupted, thus, shifting the perceptions of international relations into the field of realism and pessimism.

The conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was one of the bloodiest conflicts transferred to Soviet Azerbaijan in 1921 (mostly under the Bolshevik-Young Turks agreement) under Lenin-Stalin couple’s political decision, where firstly Turkey’s political-diplomatic and secondly military implicit involvement made the situation worse.

Initially the perspective of Armenian independence, which was guided by the claim of reunification with Armenia, and the one of self-determination and independence of the Armenian-populated enclave of Soviet Azerbaijan in compliance with the international law and Soviet legislation, was distressing for the Turkish political-scientific circles. 

Already at the beginning of 1990 there were concerns that in case of the independence of Armenia Turkey would find itself in the Armenia-Greece claiming pincer[1]. The main concern was that the destruction of a small part of the Turkish-Bolshevik great deal might lead to the collapse of a larger agreement, by which the borders of the USSR and Turkey were drawn at the expense of splitting and transferring Armenian territories to the possession of Turkey and Azerbaijan. 

Besides the above-mentioned Turkish subjective-hypothetical perceptions, Karabakh conflict was also objectively threatening to influence the Armenian-Turkish relations. At the early stage of conflict (1988-1990) Azerbaijan responded to the self-determination claim of Artsakh with the mass slaughter of the Armenians in Sumgait (February 1988), Baku, Kirovabad/Gandzak and elsewhere (January 1990) as well as with “Operation Ring” punitive action jointly with O.M.O.N.[2] (April 1991) and economic blockade thereafter. 

Those actions evoked the worst associations not only with the Armenian-Azeri bloody conflicts at the beginning of the century but also with the Armenian Genocide implemented in the Ottoman Empire, which took the lives of one and a half million Armenians and the whole historic homeland. In the collective consciousness of the Armenians, indirect twisting of the knife in the Armenian-Turkish wound had already put the normalization of those relations under risk.

Despite this factor, the messages exchanged between Yerevan and Ankara in the earliest period of Karabakh conflict were about rapprochement intentions. According to the Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Armenia LevonTer-Petrossian, “Armenia should establish relations inherent to civilized countries with all its neighbours, including Turkey.[3]

On 7 January 1991 the President of Turkey declared about the plan to establish economic relations with Armenia[4]. On April 1991 Ter-Petrossian assured the Turkish Ambassador to the USSR VolkanVural, who had arrived in Yerevan then, that Armenia was changing and wanted to become friends and was ready for any type of mutually-beneficial cooperation with Turkey, pointing out that “Armenia does not have any territorial claim towards Turkey[5].” The Turkish Ambassador passed an optimistic report to Ankara stating “that the new policy toward Turkey adopted by the current Armenian governing bodies is modern and is in the best interests of the two peoples[6].”

Conversely, Ankara was concerned about the interview given to “Argumenty I Fakty” (translated as Arguments and Facts) weekly by Ter-Petrossian on 11 May 1991 stating that after the failure of the idea of permanent revolution in Europe in 1920-1921, Soviet Russia turned its eyes on the East and in order to get support from Turkey and Muslim nations in its undertaking Armenia was amputated, yielding Kars province to Turkey and Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan[7].

Nevertheless, in June 1991 the Turkish Government tacitly approved a project on putting the port of Trabson at Armenia’s disposal and creating a free trade port in Trabzon, jointly run by the Jewish businessman and Chairman of Alarko Holding İshak Alaton and the US Armenian businessman and Chairman of the Armenian Assembly of America[8] Hrair Hovnanyan. This great project raised a lot of goals, such as transferring natural gas and oil of the republics of Central Asia to Trabzon via Armenia and then to Western markets, as well as opening border points with Armenia, restoring the disaster zone, improving industrial enterprises and constructing Erzurum-Trabzon railway[9].

On September 11 during the meeting with the United States House of Representatives Ter-Petrossian declared, "There are serious historical controversies between Armenia and Turkey. The Armenian people cannot forget the Genocide of 1915 committed against it; their demand for the international recognition of the genocide is quite righteous and legal. But in spite of all this Armenia and Turkey should normalize their relations."[10]

Thus, before becoming an independent country, Armenia had already shaped its stance towards Turkey – no territorial claims towards Turkey, relations are normalized leaving aside historical controversies and irrespective of the process of international recognition of the Armenian Genocide. 

However, especially the last among the mentioned points was a subject of concern for Ankara, which impelled Ankara to blockade even the minimal chances thereof in all its actions and undertakings and apply a whole arsenal of a “thick-pancake-and-whip” policy towards lobbying organizations in Armenia and Diaspora in the sectors of economy, security and politics.

The beginning of the Turkish policy of preconditions

After the independence of Armenia and Azerbaijan in the fall of 1991, as well as after the independence referendum of Nagorno-Karabakh on December 10 (On December 26 it was officially announced about the collapse of the Soviet Union), Azerbaijan applied to the war of aggression encircling the Armenian “rebellious” region in the ring of military actions and giving a start to the hostility phase of the conflict (1991-94). 

In this phase Turkey provided Azerbaijan with not only political, diplomatic but also military assistance, especially when after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Caucasus there was no any other alternative of restraining military forces. According to an article that was published in a 2000 issue of Survival magazine, Turkey had arranged "a secret airlift of 5000 rifles, ammunition and mortars to Azerbaijan via Nakhichevan" in mid-1991[11].

By casting a retrospective look not only at this but also at the historical events, the published facts make it obvious that Turkey encouraged Azerbaijan from the very beginning by showing an implicit military-political support to the latter in suppressing the separation claim of the Armenian-populated region. And on the diplomatic front, Turkey was trying to reach the elimination of the basis of the Armenain-Turkish claiming policy by exercising indirect pressure and economic bait on Armenia through this factor.  

In December 1991, the Turkish press reported the Chairman of Alarko Holding Alaton having said that the lobbying organization of his Armenian business partner will give up its campaign for the Armenian genocide recognition as a result of the Armenian-Turkish joint venture. When the Armenian Assembly of America immediately denied it, the Turkish press subsequently accused İ.Alaton of lying for his own business interests[12].

Even though the Turkish government recognized the independence of the Republic of Armenia on 16 December 1991, it did not rush to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia. In a message of 24 December 1991 to Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel stated that Turkey will develop mutually friendly relations with the Armenian government in accordance with OSCE principles”, which “imply accepting the territorial integrity of states and border inviolability”.[13]

In January-March 1992 when the membership applications were considered in the UN, CoE and OSCE, official Ankara tried to take “hostage” the Armenian issue and oblige Armenia to officially refuse pursuing Genocide recognition and claiming.

The following preconditions were set forth for the establishment of diplomatic relations: Armenia must (1) de jure recognize its present borders with Turkey by ratifying the Kars and Moscow Treaties, (2)not refer to the Armenian Genocide of 1915, officially abandon the efforts and claim to reaffirm it globally, adopt laws that would exclude racial, ethnic, religious intolerance in Armenia, as well as towards OSCE states, (3) criticize terrorism, not sponsor and not support organizations that have territorial claims, (4) exercise pressure on Nagorno-Karabakh to stop fighting and accept supremacy and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

The first three preconditions above were officially put forward by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Hikmet Cetin in CSCE / OSCE meeting in Prague at the end of January, and the one referring to Nagorno-Karabkh conflict was added a short time later[14].

Arrived in Turkey by İshak Alaton’s invitation to familiarize with the conditions of free trade zone in Trabzon on 13 February 1992, Hrayr Hovnanyan and Van Grigoryan were hosted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey H. Ceti. The news appeared in the Turkish press. Ceti, who was accused of hosting “the enemies of Turkey and the leaders of the genocidal campaign” officially, explained that he had appointed meeting merely with Alaton without being aware of the presence of two Armenian lobbyists. İ. Alaton was forced out from the joint venture for “entrapping” the Minister of Foreign Affairs, while the real reason was that the two Armenian lobbying organizations had refuted the news spread by the Turkish authorities on abandoning the campaign for the international recognition of the Genocide.

Old hostility officialized with new conflict

Military actions launched in the Karabakh conflict zone since February 1992 left dramatic effect on the process of the relations of Ankara and Yerevan which  were still politically examining each other.   

In response to the growing criticism on Ankara’s “inaction and toleration of the Armenian “aggression”” regarding Karabakh issue in the Turkish society, the Turkish authorities launched the policy of repression and intimidation firstly through rhetoric and secondly through force. 

After the events in Khojaly, on 4 March when making a speech in Izmir, Turkish President Turgut Ozal demanded that international community took more decisive steps to counter the "Armenian atrocities". Hinting at the possibility of armed confrontation, he pondered using Turkish military forces "to halt the Armenian progression.”[15] The Turkish II corps near the border of Armenia (Kars-Sarighamish-Igdir) launched “Winter-92”military exercises, which gave rise to the concerns about Turkish invasion in Armenia.[16]

Already in March Turkey began to inspect the planes which were carrying humanitarian aid to Armenia which caused outrage in West. In response to the diplomatic queries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey defiantly noted that "Turkey has no intention of changing its policy of checking planes flying to the region of Karabakh conflict under any outside pressure."[17]

Prompt and sequential liberation of Shushi on 9 May 1992 and Berdzor/Lachin corridor in 18 May as well as breakage of the imposed blockade caused outrage in Turkey. But the information about the military actions (battles) taken by Armenian forces to liberate the surrounding heights of Sadarak town of Nakhichevan caused even much more outrage, which resulted in discussions in Ankara on possible armed incursion based on the rights vested to Turkey under the Treaty of Kars. Chief of Staff of Turkish Armed Forces General Doğan Güreş announced that he “is ready to send as many soldiers to the zone of Karabakh conflict as requested by the Azerbaijani government.”[18] Infantry general Muhittin Fisunoğlu announced that "all necessary preparations are done and the army is waiting for a command from Ankara in order to set off.”[19] 

On 18 May, the Turkish cabinet of ministers adopted a statement, warning that "Armenia is heading the wrong way. If it does not stand back from its aggressive politics, it will bear responsibility for the consequences." Speaker of Parliament Hikmet Zindoruk then announced, "Turkey's patience has limits. One should not test it too long."[20]

Immediately, Russia responded to the threatening statements on the invasion of the Caucasus. The Military Commander of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Marshall Yevgeni Shaposhnikov announced that "if another side enters there, we may find ourselves on the threshold of World War III."[21] It somehow softened the rhetoric of Ankara on the Karabakh issue, although did not prevent it from an obvious military ambitions.[22]

On 2 June in the interview to Cumhurriyet, a Turkish newspaper, Armenian President Ter- Petrossian criticized Ankara for “pursuing Panturanist policies in Central Asia and the South Caucasus and the aim of filling in the political vacuum that has emerged in the region.”

He said, "Would Turkey not pursue such aims but instead develop its policies on the basis of cultural, scientific and economic developments, we would gladly welcome it. Armenia would participate in such cooperation with pleasure. We believe it would be very effective. […]  If there had been diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey […] there would be peace in the region. But I think even now it is not late for this."[23]

On 14 June, during the meeting with Levon Ter-Petrossian in Rio de Janeiro the Prime Minister of Turkey Demirel intimated: "You cannot reach your purposes by war or clashes. […] You are surrounded by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Unless you establish friendly relations with them, you will find yourself in serious problems and difficulties." Reacting to Ter-Petrossian's view that it was Azerbaijan not Armenia that started the Karabakh war, the Prime Minister of Turkey added: "If you want peace, then leave Shushi and Lachin. Moreover, you should know that we are following the events around Nakhichevan with deep concern. We advise you to solve your issues through negotiations with Nakhichevan and Azerbaijan … Try to govern your country, and do not invite other countries to interfere in your internal affairs. And do not allow the American Armenians to govern you and your affairs.”[24]

On 23-26 June 1992 the visit of the delegation headed by Levon Ter-Petrossian to Turkey to participate in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation summit had a certain positive impact in terms of continuing bilateral relations.[25] During the meeting with the Prime Minister Demirel the RA President mentioned that bilateral relations should not be conditioned by Armenian-Azerbaijan relations. Demirel underscored that he agreed in principle, however the blood was sheding in Artsakh and the only circumstance hindering the establishment of diplomatic relations between two countries were the lasting military clashes. 

On 23-25 August 1992, a Turkish delegation led by the Bilgin Unan, the Turkish foreign ministry's deputy undersecretary, arrived in Yerevan. The Armenian side announced that Yerevan was ready to conclude an agreement on establishing bilateral relations with Turkey. While B. Unan mentioned that Armenia must recognize the territorial integrity of both Turkey and Azerbaijan. Regarding the very precondition, Yerevan explained that by joining UN, Armenia had committed itself to respect the principle of territorial integrity[26]. None the less, the parties agreed to end the negotiations regarding the issue of recognition of the existing borders in winter 1993, which was left unfinished.[27]

The Armenian-Turkish relations marred again on 10 September 1992 as a result of the statements made by the Armenian Foreign Minister Raffi Hovhannisian at a Council of Europe summit in Istanbul. In his statements he made reference to the Armenian Genocide, blasted Turkey for not establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia, obstructing Armenia’s accession to the European institutions (CoE, CSCE), taking sides in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, hampering the humanitarian aid to Armenia and for showing military support to Azerbaijan. R. Hovhanissian pointed out that “There are Turkish military advisers and officers in Azerbaijan”, and “there are great many reports about the transfer of weapons from Turkey into Azerbaijan.”[28].

From the policy of punishment to the threat of incursion

In April 1993, the thread of successful offensive operations of the Armenian forces in Karvachar (Kelbajar) once more resulted in a great strain in the Armenian-Turkish relations. On 3 April, the Prime Minister S. Demirel warned that both Armenia and the world did not assess the patience of Turkey in the right way. 

On 5 April, the day the Armenians captured Kelbajar, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned: "Armenia is trying to violate the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan by use of force and change the borders recognized by the whole world." On the same day Turkey closed “H-50” airspace to Armenia-bound flights, shut down the Kars-Gyumri railway and banned the transfer of humanitarian aid through its territory.[29]

Turkish President Turgut Ozal announced: “A corridor was opened from above and below and, in fact, bound this region to Armenia. There is no more a Karabakh issue; there are the Armenian wishes about the Great Armenia. […] Do not ask me whether we would invade Armenia or not. But Turkey should calculate its steps well."[30]

Three army brigades of Turkey were mobilized near the Armenian-Turkish border under the guise of military exercises: "What would happen if during military exercises three of our bombs fall in the Armenian territory? What would happen if we sent 1-2 military brigades to Nakhichevan? We are bound to Nakhichevan with an agreement. What would happen, who would do us anything, who would come to intervene? Who could intervene in Bosnia? In world politics we can reach nothing without resorting to risk, “announced the President of Turkey through a number of rhetorical questions.[31]

His statements about the Armenian Genocide were quite dangerous, which deepened the wound more and more: "The Armenians learn nothing from history. In Anatolia, they also tried it. But they got an incredible slap in the face. And they have not forgotten the pain to this day. If they try it again here (in Azerbaijan), relying on this or that foreign country for help, they have something coming.”[32]

With the Turkish parliament on the verge of concluding a military treaty with Azerbaijan, the White House warned "that it will not tolerate a third country's interference in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict."[33] On 17 April the Turkish president excluded the possibility of war against Armenia.

Within the scope of its policy to suppress Armenia, nothing was left to Ankara but periodically turn to the United Nations Security Council to provide diplomatic support to Azerbaijan, come out with a number of diplomatic initiatives in OSCE, as a result of which UNSC adopted 4 resolutions.  Just after the first resolution Turkey declared that in case ignoring the resolution, sanctions should be imposed on the “aggressor”, referring to the international compulsion.   

By the early autumn Turkish troops had been on hair-trigger alert to enter Armenia and the Caucasus at the first opportunity. The collapse of Yeltsin’s power and the success of the Putsch led by Khasbulatov and Ruchko in autumn 1993 should have created such an opportunity. 

First Ambassador of Greece to Armenia Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos wrote about this time period in his chronicles, stating that on 5 October Ter-Petrossian told him that according to the resolution of the National Security Council on putting the army to the heighest alert possible for them to be able to protect the country from the invasion of Turkey, in case a possible withdrawal of the Russian troops.  As informed by Ter-Petrossian based on the information from various sources the Kurdish issue or the protection of Nakhichevan should have served as a pretext for Turkey.[34]

On 11 October the French Ambassador provided the Ambassador of Greece with the information (also confirmed by the American diplomats) from the intelligence service of his country, which, based on the agreement reached between Ankara and Khasbulatov, read the following, “If he continues to hold office, he will enable Turkey to take limited actions in Armenia under the pretext of the Kurdish issue, as well as in Georgia for the safety of Abkhazia.” For this purpose the Russian troops should have been withdrawn from Armenia. Finally, on 12 October the Minister of Defense of Armenia Vazgen Sargsyan also provided the same information to the Ambassador, again speaking about upcoming “some important events” in Moscow and Turkish troops noticed to be fortifying along the Armenian border.[35]

It is noteworthy that on 26 July 1993 Ankara was preparing the pretext of intrusion on the campaign front. Turkish Minister of Interior Mehmet Gaziogli started accusing the Armenian government of ties with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Armenia avowed that it had no connection with the PKK, and that there was no PKK office in Yerevan.[36]

On 4 October the failure of the plans to suppress Putsch in Russia and withdraw Russian troops from Armenia stopped the perspective of the limited actions of the Turkish armed forces in the Caucasus.   And on 24 of the same month Nagorno-Karabakh got a reliable land communication and border also with Iran due to the Armenian military advances in the regions of Kovsakan (Zangelan) and Horadis - the Karabakh conflict zone.

The policy of closed border

By the time the Karabakh conflict phase ended in May 1994 under the tripartite ceasefire agreement, Armenia-Turkey rapprochement had already ended a year ago with a unilateral closure of the border.

No matter whether Ankara related its action to the Karabakh issue firstly, no less was important the fact that it failed to reach the maximum, that is meeting four preconditions, neither through suppressions, intimidations nor through economic interests. Armenia did its utmost in the bilateral format announcing the absence of territorial claims.

Meanwhile Turkey, that was trying to return to the Caucasian region after a 70-year interval, participate in the Big Game, fill in the geopolitical vacuum as a result of ousting Russia, bolster its position in Transcaucasia and Central Asia by use of ethnic and cultural ties, was willing to get more both to insure itself from claiming and to meet its objectives of regional policy. 

In the war against Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia unleashed by Azerbaijan, by Turkey’s military-political-diplomatic support to Azerbaijan, Ankara itself joined two dimensions of the conflict - Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Azerbaijani, thus refreshing the image of a Turk - the everlasting enemy in the eyes of the Armenians. Accordingly, the perspective of declutching them from each other is in its hands.   

The official slogan "one nation, two states" defining the status of the Turkish-Azerbaijani relations and  voiced from Ankara and Baku did not leave room for the victory of the thesis “Turks and Turkey have changed” among Armenians, paving its way for a more durable realistic perception – “The Turk remains a Turk”.   

By closing its border with Armenia in 1993, Ankara officialized the link between axes of two conflicts, conditioning the opening of the border by official Yerevan’s territorial concessions in favor of Azerbaijan and refusing persecution of the Genocide recognition and Armenian claim, which up to date remains the backbone of hard-line supporters.[37]

The Turkish-Azerbaijani joint policy to blockade Armenia and isolate from regional projects gave a perfect and complete picture of the Armenian policy of Turkey by adding Karabakh conflict - one more issue to not-so-easy issues of the Armenian-Turkish agenda, and Ankara neither can, nor wishes to get rid of the burden for the sake of justice.


[1] Chakaryan H., Karabakh issue in the context of the Armenian-Turkish relations, Yerevan, p. 11

[2] USSR Special Purpose Mobile Units, Russian name (ОМОН-отряды милиции особого назначения), which jointly with the militsiya of Azerbaijan were taking paramilitary actions to intimidate Armenians in NKAO and Armenian populated border settlements of Armenia under the guise of disarming of the Armenian volunteer units.  

[3] Hakob Chakaryan, Karabakh issue in the context of the Armenian-Turkish relations, Yerevan, 1998, p. 11

[4] Azg daily, 27. 05. 1991

[5] Nezavisimaya Gazeta daily, 14.05.1991

[6] Hürriyet, 02.05.1991

[7] Argumenty I Fakty weekly, 11.05.1991.

[8] Armenian lobbying organizations

[9] Hakob Chakaryan, Karabakh issue in the context of the Armenian-Turkish relations, Yerevan, 1998, p. 15

[10] Azg daily, September 11, 1991

[11] R. Bronson; R. Bhatty, “NATO’s mixed signals in the South Caucasus and Central Asia”, Survival, volume 42, issue 3, January 2000, p.134.

[12] Tigran Mkrtchyan,Тhe Role of NGO's in Turkey-Armenia Rapprochement, p. 155,,%20Goksel%20-%20The%20Role%20of%20NGOs%20in%20Turkey-Armenia%20Rapprochement%20-%20November%202009.pdf, in: Non-traditional Security Threats and Regional Cooperation in the Southern Caucasus, 

[13] Armenian National Archive, Fund 326, 9/192, pp. 1-2.

[14] Foreign Minister Raffi Hovhannisian’s memoirs on the speech of Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey Hikmet Cetin in CSCE / OSCE meeting, cited during his speech in the Georgetown University; for the Armenian version see - , for the English version see -, including comments by Christian Ter Stepanian, Adviser to Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia – Azg Daily, 12 February 1992.

[15] Cumhuriyet, 05.03.1992

[16] Artak Zakaryan, Turkey and Artsakh conflict,

[17] Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23,06,1992

[18] Turkish Daily News, 27.05.1992

[19] Hayk Demoian, Turkey and the Karabakh Conflict (Turtsiya I Karabakhskiy Konflikt, in Russian), Yerevan, 2006, p.32,

[20] Azg Daily, 20 May 1992

[21] Turkish Daily News, 21.05.1992

[22] According to the Russian intelligence service data there were 670 Turkish servicemen in the Azerbaijan army as of September 1992 – 550 soldiers, 112 officers and 8 generals. A. Avagyan., Turkish nationalist activities in Azerbaijan1990-1994. Armenian Army, 3(49), 2006, p. 50:

According to the article published in the Survival magazine in 2000, Turkey had trained 450 volunteers in the military base in Gabala city of Azerbaijan belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.  R. Bronson; R. Bhatty, “NATO’s mixed signals in the South Caucasus and Central Asia”, Survival, volume 42, issue 3, January 2000, p.134.

According to the Russian press, 5-6 thousand Turkish troops had entered Azerbaijan by the end of 1992, Hayk Demoyan, Turkey and the Karabakh Conflict, Yerevan, 2006, a reference from „Literaturnaya Gazeta” (Russian) dated 23.09.1992 is made in the book.

[23] Azg Daily, 4 June 1992, translation from the article of Cumhurriyet, 2 June, 1992

[24] Azg Daily, 18 June 1992

[25] Milliyet, 27.06.1992.

[26] Republic of Armenia, 26.09.1992.

[27] Gerard J. Libaridian. Modern Armenia: People, Nation, State, Chicago, 2004, p. 269.

[28] Speech by the Armenian Foreign Minister Raffi Hovhannisian at a Council of Europe summit, Istanbul, 10 September 1992

[29] RA MFA, Middle East Department, Turkish Division, Armenia-Turkey, Chronology, (Armenia-Turkey open dialogue), Center of Public Dialogues and Development, Yerevan, 2005,

[30] Milliyet, 08.04.1993

[31] Hürriyet, 08.04.1993.

[32] Türkiye, 16.04.1993.

[33] Azg Daily, 17 April 1993

[34] Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, “Coup in Armenia. Chronicles of a diplomat”, p. 88

[35] According to Vazgen Sargsyan, “At the same time Turkey added two brigades and 15 helicopters to its military units in Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. Turkey had been already creating tension on the border and opened fire with light weapons towards the Armenian border. Russian troops refrained from answering to the burst of machine-gun fire. […] It was clear for the government that Turkey will not dare to attack, unless Russian troops are located in Armenia.”; Leonidas Chrysanthopoulos, “Coup in Armenia. Chronicles of a diplomat”, p. 90.    

[36] Azg Daily, 27 July 1993

[37] Afsaneh Shirani, Development of Interstate Relations  between Armenia and Turkey (1991-2013),